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FROM GERMAN SHEPHERDS TO WET POODLES': THE SEC ExAcTs
CONCESSIONS FROM DAIMLER-BENZ CONCERNING DISCLOSURE OF ITS
HIDDEN RESERVES
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In October 1993, Daimler-Benz AG ("Daimler") became the first German
corporation to list its shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).2
After three years of negotiation with an unyielding Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which had insisted that Daimler reconcile its financial
statements to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (USGAAP), an
agreement was struck whereby the company agreed to disclose its "hidden
reserves."3 Soon after, the SEC, by unanimous vote, granted Daimler and
other highly capitalized German corporations wide-ranging exemptions from
the trading rules4 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' ("Exchange
Act"), which aim to restrict the participants in securities distributions from
artificially increasing or maintaining a security's price during the distribution
period.6
A. German Efforts to Gain Listings on U.S. Exchanges-an Overview
Since as early as 1990, blue-chip German corporations have sought SEC
approval to list their shares on U.S. stock exchanges, principally on the
NYSE.7 Among the perceived advantages of U.S. listing are the ease of
The reference in the title to wet poodles derives from a statement made by Gerhard
Liener, Daimler-Benz's Chief Financial Officer. See infra, text accompanying note 47.
2 Jim Henry, Another Benz Pulls onto Wall Street; Daimler Battled for Years to Gain
NYSE Listing, AUToMoTrVE NEWS, Oct. 11, 1993, at 7.
3 Id. For a discussion of the hidden reserves issue, see infra text accompanying note 10.
4 Rules lOb-6, lOb-7 and lOb-8.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
6 SEC Gives Exemptions From Trading Rules, Eases Distributions of German Securities,
25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1336 (Oct. 8, 1993). At its November 3, 1993
meeting, the SEC adopted a Statement of Policy granting class exemptions from the trading
rules for foreign issuers generally, subject to "substantially similar principles, terms, and
conditions that applied to the exemptions" granted to the Germans. Rule Exceptions Adopted
to Ease Rule 144A Foreign Offerings to QIBs, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at
1524 (Nov. 12, 1993).
' Anita Raghavan & Michael Sesit, Foreigners Fall in Love with U.S. Financing, FIN.
POST, Oct. 6, 1993, at 9.
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access to capital generated by a soaring demand for stock among investors
disappointed with low long-term interest rates, the prospect of a higher stock
price, and enhanced prestige in the vitally important U.S. market
From the beginning, the German firms clashed with the SEC (which must
approve listings on U.S. exchanges) over the pervasive practice in German
corporate accounting of establishing "hidden reserves."'  This practice,
which is not permitted under USGAAP, helps German firms to mitigate the
effects of a high corporate tax rate (up to 65% of earnings). In addition,
"[w]henever product demand slackens and operating losses develop, these
companies tap the reserves, built up from earlier earnings, to offset the loss
and show a modest profit."'"
Concededly, reconciling German companies' financial statements with
USGAAP is an expensive and time-consuming proposition. For example,
before Espirito Santo Financial Holdings SA, a Portuguese bank and
insurance holding company, listed a large number of American Depository
Receipts on the NYSE in 1993, it spent nearly a year preparing the financial
documents needed to meet the SEC's standards."
Needless to say, U.S. and all other foreign companies seeking either listing
on an exchange under the Exchange Act14 or registration of a public
offering under the Securities Act of 1933"s ("Securities Act") must disclose
their true financial condition and results of business operations in accordance
with USGAAP. 6 Through 1992, however, the German blue chips remained
s Id. See also Henry, supra note 2, at 7 ("The stock listing plays a symbolic role: it tells
the nation that Daimler has a stake here, and it helps strengthen Daimler's reputation as an
international company").
' Under the Exchange Act, "a foreign company that lists securities on a U.S. exchange
or arranges to have its shares quoted on NASDAQ is treated as having entered voluntarily the
U.S. markets, and must register under the ... Act the class of securities to be listed or
quoted." 1 EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SEcuitiS MARKETS § 2.03 (1992).
1 See Erik Kirschbaum, German Shares Want U.S. Listing, But S.E.C. a Hurdle, Reuters,
Feb. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuter File.
12 Raghavan & Sesit, supra note 7, at 9.
13 Idu
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
's 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1988).
16Substantive disclosure requirements for foreign issuers under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act are the same. Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System,
Securities Act Release No. 6437, 1982 SEC LEXIS 355 (Nov. 19, 1982).
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confident that they could convince the SEC to relent. 17 At first, firms such
as BASF AG, a chemical company, expressed puzzlement with the SEC's
position on hidden reserves, and assumed a confrontational stance. Dietrich
Kley, BASF's Chief Financial Officer, lamented the SEC's "oddly rigid
standpoint," noting that "[t]o be listed in Germany, U.S. firms don't have to
prepare reports according to German standards."'8
But Richard C. Breeden, the SEC's Chairman from October 1989 to May
1993, would hear nothing of reciprocity: "It is inconceivable that we would
have mutual recognition with Germany."' 19 Breeden observed that a
German company "can adjust its accounts to add to and subtract from
reported earnings. The investor has no way to tell what the real level of
earnings is."'
As late as November 1992, German companies pressed the issue with the
SEC, believing that "competitive pressures" resulting from the globalization
of world financial markets would force the SEC to relent.2" Breeden,
though, remained adamant. When told in November 1992 of German
executives' popular belief that the SEC would be forced to allow German
companies to enter the U.S. markets without reconciling their financial
statements to USGAAP, Breeden balked:
They can wait forever. We have 500 foreign listed
companies in our market from 35 countries and they all
have the same standard. They get the same deal American
companies get; they don't get a preference. And the
German companies are not going to get a preference in
raising capital against U.S. companies.. . . There is a touch
of arrogance in one country saying they are entitled to a
iBusinesses Urge Retaliation Against SEC's Listing Policy, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (Buraff)
(Oct. 20, 1992).
'8 Kirschbaum, supra note 10. Germany, which is only now moving toward the creation
of a centralized securities regulatory regime, does not force American firms to conform to
German accounting norms. However, this point seems irrelevant-United States accounting
principles are simply more stringent than those of Germany, and so Kley's demand for
reciprocity rings hollow.
19 Jonathan Fuerbringer, World Markets; S.E.C. Says No On German Stocks, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1992, § 3, at 15.201d.
21 Chairman Richard Breeden Discusses SEC's International Role, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.
(Buraff) (Nov. 17, 1992).
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preference that no other country in the world gets, and it's
a preference over American companies in their own mar-
ket.22
Breeden proceeded to emphasize the reasons underlying the SEC's
position regarding hidden reserves:
What is being argued [by advocates of the German
system] is that the management should know what the
company really made and the public investor should not be
entitled to that information, and they are out there trading
against each other. Now that's called inside information.
And the assertion of the right to be a public company but
put out knowingly false statements of what you actually
earned is an assertion of the right to institutionalize insider
trading.23
And if any doubt remained about his resolve in waiting out the Germans,
Breeden added,
In the last three years we have had 149 new foreign
companies come to our market. In London and Tokyo, the
number has actually declined... . If the Germans want to sit
on the sidelines while everyone else in the world is financ-
ing in the U.S. market, that's their decision. There's no
shortage of foreign listings in the United States.
In 1987, we had $272 billion in public offerings, this year
it will be over $900 billion. We're not suffering from a lack
of public offerings. And among the reasons investors are
willing to buy $900 billion instead of $200 billion is that
they have confidence in our system; they get information
they want. Investors want to know what a company made.







Importantly, the hidden reserves issue did not amount solely to a battle
along national lines; it must be remembered that the Germans were not
without allies in the United States. Most significantly, the New York Stock
Exchange through its Chairman, William Donaldson, has for years lobbied
the SEC to admit German companies without requiring them to conform to
U.S. standards.25 Donaldson argued that the 2,500 foreign companies
(German and otherwise) that could be listed on the NYSE would be a boon
to U.S. investors; that Americans who are currently forced to buy foreign
stocks abroad receive little protection and pay higher cost; and that the SEC
is using "technical rules" to keep out foreign companies.
26
Not surprisingly, the SEC's Breeden bristled at the dismissive description
of the disclosure requirements as "technical rules." '27 To Breeden and to
most commentators, the disclosure rules lie at the heart of the American
federal securities regulatory regime.'
Through 1992, all of the leading German corporations-Daimler,
Volkswagen, Deutsche Bank, BASF, Hoechst, Bayer and Siemens--continu-
ed to push for listings on NYSE, to no avail. In October 1992, the
economics minister of the state of Hesse was dispatched to Washington to
do battle with the SEC, and like a string of government officials and private
executives before him, he returned to the Continent empty-handed. 29 A
conference was convened in Frankfurt to provide an outlet for the Germans'
indignation. "It's a disgrace. We must insist on reciprocity from the United
States," said a Deutsche Bank director.3  And from Rutbert Reisch,
Volkswagen's Treasurer, came a scathing denouncement of the entire
American regulatory regime: "I am anything but impressed with the S.E.C.
The performance of the S.E.C. in the 1980s shows it doesn't make much
difference whether you have a private or a federal form of market over-
sight."
2' Raghavan & Sesit, supra note 7, at 9.
26 Fuerbringer, supra note 19, § 3 at 15.27Id
2 See generally Louis LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 25-35 (1988
& Supp. 1993) (outlining in some detail the legislative purpose of the federal securities laws).
It must be remembered, too, that NYSE's stance is driven by its desire to attract the world's
"big players" to its bourse.
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Other conference participants traced the source of the rift to a fundamental
difference of philosophies between the U.S. and German systems. Horst
Risse of Deutsche Bank Capital Corp. remarked that while investor
protection takes precedence in U.S. regulatory philosophy, German regulation
places emphasis upon protection of creditors.32
Despite the bellicose flavor of the October 1992 Frankfurt conference,
some of its participants acknowledged that the German firms were plagued
by both a "credibility problem" and a "bad image,"33 conceding that
proposed legislation to create a central regulatory agency and to criminalize
insider trading was a step in the right direction.'
B. The Breakthrough-Daimler's Compromise with the SEC
In March 1993, Daimler broke ranks with its fellow firms and struck a
deal with the SEC.3" The company agreed to undertake the arduous task
of conforming its financial statement to U.S. standards, including the
recognition of DM 4 billion ($2.5 billion) of hidden reserves.' In return,
Daimler would incur no formal obligation to report quarterly earnings,37 nor
would it have to restate its results for the previous five years, as would
normally be required.38
Despite a $592 million first-half loss in 1993 that resulted from revising
its accounts (its first loss since World War II39), Daimler's leaders were
enthusiastic about the firm's imminent listing on the NYSE. Daimler's
chairperson, Edzard Reuter, who derided the SEC's disclosure rules before
32 ld. Just how the practice of concealing earnings jibes with a system solicitous of
creditors is unclear. See infra, text accompanying note 64 for a discussion of this "what-they-
don't-know-won't-hurt-them" theory and its inherent incompatibility with U.S. securities
regulation.
33 id.
35 Erik Kirschbaum, German Firms Wait for Details on Daimler NYSE Bid, Reuters,
March 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuter File.
3 Daimler-Benz's Gerhard Liener: Accommodating (Partly) U.S. Disclosure Rules,
INSTITIrlONAL INVESTOR, June 1993, at 52.
37 Id.
' Henry, supra note 2, at 7.
39 Rhagavan & Sesit, supra note 7, at 9.
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the deal was struck for "bringing too much attention to short term profits"'
at the expense of long-term growth, now praised the deal as "a historic
moment for our company, and for our country." '
Whether Reuter's fellow CEOs agreed that Daimler's listing was a great
moment for Germany is unclear. Many executives were reportedly angered
at Daimler's defection.42 BASF representatives balked at the prospect of
"having two kinds of accounts, one for international investors and one at
home. 43 BMW feared that the cost of reconciling its books to U.S. norms
would be prohibitive.' Hoechst claimed no interest in a New York listing
if the SEC did not recognize the validity of German accounting principles.45
Siemens, while denying a desire to list in New York, and claiming no need
to raise new capital, nevertheless admitted that it is moving toward making
its accounts more transparent.46
Gerhard Liener, Daimler's Chief Financial Officer, who headed his
company's negotiations with the SEC, summarized the evolution of his
position: "We wanted to try and overwhelm the SEC with power.... We
marched in with the flag of German GAAP ... flying. The U.S. said 'U.S.
GAAP was the best thing, and forget about it.' There was no flexibility on
either side. We went back to Germany like a wet poodle." '47 Over time,
however, a combination of shrinking profits, a growing need for capital and
the perception that newly-elected President Bill Clinton would appoint a new
SEC chairperson led to Daimler's decision to re-negotiate.4 In a speech
in early October 1993, Lieder said to Breeden, whose term as SEC
chairperson had not yet expired, "As is so often the case, the two fighters,
you and I, we are friends now."
o Henry, supra note 2, at 7. According to Henry, Reuter claimed that "American
investors would not have allowed him to pursue a long-term strategy, initiated in 1985, that
has seen Daimler branch out into aerospace, electronics and financial services." Id. In
addition, American investors may have demanded a higher dividend had Daimler disclosed
its hidden reserves. But is it wrong for a company's owners to make such a demand?
41 Id.
42 Daimler-Benz's Gerhard Liener, supra note 36, at 52.
13 European Business: Daimler-Benz Causes Accounting Stir, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar.
29, 1993, at 23.
"Id.
4 Kirschbaum, German Firms Wait for Details on Daimler NYSE Bid, supra note 35.
4European Business, supra note 43, at 23.
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C. German Blue Chips Granted Exemptions from Exchange Act Trading
Rules
Soon after Daimler's decision to disclose its hidden reserves bore fruit in
its listing on NYSE, the SEC voted unanimously on October 6, 1993, to
grant the largest German companies (including Daimler) exemption from
Rules lOb-6, lOb-7 and lOb-8, the so-called "trading rules."'  The rules,
which generally prohibit trading by a security's issuer or underwriter during
the distribution period, are highly complex."'
The exemptions apply to distributions of the 30 German issuers whose
securities make up the Deutscher Aktienindex (the "DAX", Germany's blue
chip exchange) and impose several conditions. The conditions include "the
disclosure of potential trading activities in Germany, the limitation of certain
proprietary trading, notice of reliance upon the exemption and certain
recordkeeping and reporting to German authorities."-2
H. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Disclosure Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts
As previously mentioned, 3 the same sorts of substantive information
must be disclosed by companies under both the Securities Act' and the
Exchange Act."s Form 20-F, an Exchange Act form, is the basis for the
disclosure mandated by both statutes for foreign companies; the information
that must be provided in the form lay at the heart of the dispute between the
0 Exemptions From Rules lOb-6, lOb-7 and lOb-8 During Distributions of Certain
German Securities, Securities Act Release No. 7021, 1993 SEC LEXIS 2711 (Oct. 6, 1993).
See SEC Gives Exemptions From Trading Rules, Eases Distributions of German Securities,
25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1336 (Oct. 8, 1993) [hereinafter SEC Gives
Exemptions From Trading Rules].
"' See generally LOSS, supra note 28, at 862-66.
52 SEC Gives Exemptions From Trading Rules, supra note 50, at 1336.
53 See supra note 16.
' The Securities Act regulates public offerings. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 9, at
§ 1.02.
" The Exchange Act mandates periodic reporting for companies with a class of securities
traded on a national securities exchange, and by extension also regulates initial listing on an
exchange. See 1 GREENE ET AL., supra note 9, at § 1.03.
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German firms and the SEC.' A necessarily cursory summary of the
requirements of Form 20-F is as follows: Part I requires "a detailed
description of the company's business by category of activity, its major
properties, and any material pending legal proceedings or governmental
investigations, the nature of the trading markets outside the United States for
the company's securities, and a discussion of exchange controls or other
limitations affecting U.S. security holders."57 In addition, Part I calls for
the preparation of a narrative document called "Management's Discussion
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" ("MD&A"),
including a discussion of liquidity, capital resources, and results of
operations. This important requirement is intended "to give investors an
opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of management.""
Part II of Form 20-F requires a detailed description of the securities being
registered.59 Part III calls for a discussion of any recent default on
indebtedness of either the corporation or any of its major subsidiaries. 60
Part IV, which most rankled the German firms, sets out the requirement that
the financial statements must be prepared in accordance with, or reconciled
to, USGAAP. 6
1
Clearly, foreign companies seeking access to the U.S. market face no less
exacting disclosure requirements than those faced by domestic companies.
But why such an emphasis on "disclosure, again disclosure, and still more
disclosure? '62  The answer lies in the unquestioned intent of Congress.
When drafting the federal securities laws during the depths of the Depres-
sion, Congress sought to erect a regulatory scheme that focuses not on the
merits of particular investments (as do many of the state securities laws-the
"blue sky" laws), but rather on allowing investors to make informed choices.
56 Forms F-I, F-2 and F-3 are the Securities Act forms that foreign companies must
complete; Form F-I refers to Form 20-F, and both forms incorporate parts of Regulation S-K.
I at § 2.03[iJ[a][i].
-" Id at § 2.06[2l[al. The MD&A is also required for U.S. issuers. See Securities Act
Release No. 6835, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1011 (May 18, 1989), discussing the importance of the
MD&A, and identifying certain types of disclosure to be included in the statement. See also
Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, 1992 SEC LEXIS 786 (Mar. 31, 1992).
59 1 GREENE ET AL., supra note 9, at § 2.03 [llla][i].
60 u
61 1& The MD&A, discussed at note 58 and accompanying text, supra, would also be
affected by use of USGAAP.
62 Loss, supra note 28, at 7.
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As Representative Sam Rayburn explained during the House debate of the
bill that became the 1933 Act, "The purpose of this bill is to place the
owners of securities on a parity, so far as is possible, with the management
of the corporation, and to place the buyer on the same plane so far as
available information is concerned, with the seller."
If the emphasis on disclosure evinced by the federal securities laws seems
a bit overwrought in the 1990s, today's jaded observer must keep in mind
the evils that were routinely countenanced in the days before securities were
regulated. Caveat emptor ruled the day, and countless investors were bilked.
The Supreme Court, in a leading case, reaffirmed the principles animating
the securities statutes: "A fundamental purpose, common to these statutes,
was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry.""
Louis Loss traces this notion of Salvation Through Disclosure to Louis D.
Brandeis, who spoke of openness as the remedy for many of the evils of the
corporate age: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman."
In deciding to eschew regulation of the merits of investment securities, and
instead to compel exhaustive disclosure, "Congress did not take away from
the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of himself.' It simply
attempted to prevent others from making a fool of him."'
Of course, comprehensive disclosure had, and has, its critics, who charge
that compliance is most difficult for reputable, long-established firms with
many concrete operations, and easiest for the most speculative ventures of
dubious merit. In addition, they claim that exhaustive disclosure of raw
financial data does little to enable the layman to fairly assess the propriety
of an investment.67
77 CONG. Rac. 2,918 (1933).
S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
Louis D. BRANDms, Onmre PEoPLE's MONEY 92 (Frederick Stokes Co. 1914), quoted
in Loss, supra note 28, at 32. Loss adds somewhat cheekily, "The length and complexity of
some SEC prospectuses make one wish that Brandeis had recognized that excessive sunlight
can cause skin cancer."
"Loss, supra note 28, at 32-33.
'7See id. at 25-35. While requirements such as the MD&A required in Form 20-F (see
supra, text accompanying note 58) go a long way toward enabling investors to assess a
company's prospects, nowhere are projections or forward-looking information required.
Instead, only known trends must be discussed. See Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra
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For better or worse, the course of U.S. securities regulation was fixed long
ago. And that is why the German companies seeking NYSE listing
encountered a storm of opposition from the SEC on the hidden reserves
issue.
B. The Trading Rules
The regulation of trading during distributions embodied in Rules lOb-6,
lOb-7, and lOb-8 is analytically distinct from the basic disclosure require-
ments mandated by the statutes. Rule lOb-6, the focus of the trading rules,
makes it unlawful for distribution participants to bid for or purchase a
security during the distribution period, subject to enumerated exceptions.6'
Promulgated in 1955, lOb-6 was an elaboration by the SEC of earlier case
law holding that open market purchases by issuers and underwriters made
during distributions were unlawful. Presumably, these purchases were made
to prop up demand (and prices) for the security being distributed.69 Rules
lOb-7 and lOb-8 are closely related provisions, the former specifying the
terms on which distribution participants may stabilize a security's price, and
the latter announcing the terms by which "standby. underwriters" may
participate in rights offerings. lOb-7 and lOb-8 are essentially exceptions to
Rule lOb-6.
By closely regulating the practice of indirect manipulation of security
prices during distributions, the trading rules seek "to protect the integrity of
the secondary trading market as an independent pricing mechanism and
thereby enhance investor confidence in the marketplace." 0 However,
unlike the basic disclosure mandated by the securities statutes, the highly
complex trading rules from which the German blue chips received exemption
cannot be said to derive from a specific demand of Congress. Rather, the
trading rules represent a series of administrative judgments by an expert
agency, made in a fact-intensive context. In fact, the SEC has during recent
note 58.
' LOSS, supra note 28, at 863.
9 E.g., Halsey, Smart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106 (1949); Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941);
Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940); Canusa Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S.E.C. 548
(1937). See also Exchange Act Release No. 5040, 1954 SEC LEXIS 257 (May 18, 1954)
(describing the trading rules as codifying "principles which historically have applied in
considering questions relating to manipulative activity and stabilization in connection with a
distribution").
70 Loss, supra note 28, at 863.
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years taken cognizance of the special problems attending application of the
trading rules to foreign securities.71
III. ANALYSIS
The flurry of dealmaking between the SEC and large German companies
during 1993 raises questions about the SEC's proper role in regulating the
securities markets in the United States. That the Commission's far-reaching
exemption of German issuers from the trading rules followed so closely
Daimler's monumental concession on hidden reserves at least seems to
suggest a quid pro quo. Observers might wonder whether the SEC acted
properly in easing trading restrictions on an entire class of issuers, especially
when that class has been notoriously hostile to SEC regulation in the first
place. Indeed, is it fair to grant German companies special treatment, when
other nations' firms have embraced SEC regulation for years?72 And what
about U.S. investors? Has the SEC strayed from its regulatory mandate by
weakening the protections afforded to the public at large?
On the contrary, the SEC's decisions concerning German companies
represent a principled response to the growing globalization of the financial
markets and an adherence to its Congressionally-delegated mission of
protecting the investing public. In insisting that Daimler disclose its hidden
reserves, the Commission stalwartly refused to dilute the disclosure
requirements that were central to the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The statutes'
legislative histories"' left no room for compromise-to weaken the disclo-
sure requirements is to thwart the purpose of the entire regulatory scheme.
At the same time, given the genesis of the trading rules as an attempt to
proscribe very specific conduct in order to preserve the integrity of market
" See, e.g., Review of Antimanipulation Regulation of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act
Release No. 33,924 (Apr. 19, 1994) ("[A] global marketplace has unfolded, characterized by
a proliferation of multinational securities offerings. Many foreign issuers now conduct
concurrent offerings of their securities in the United States and abroad as well as solely in the
United States. This rise in the supply of, and demand for, multinational offerings has required
careful coordination of the interaction of the Trading Practice Rules with foreign distribution
practices and regulatory requirements").
' British, Canadian, and--to a lesser extent-Japanese firms have all proved willing to
work with the SEC. Indeed, the United States and Canada now have a reciprocal disclosure
agreement (the Multijurisdictional Disclosure Agreement), developed in 1987. See 1993
Supp. to Loss, supra note 28, at 16-19.
' See supra, text accompanying note 64.
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prices, the SEC acted within its authority when it granted relief from the
rules to the German firms. The trading rules do not represent a direct
command from Congress.74
In addition, one might argue that the SEC lacks the authority to apply the
trading rules extraterritorially. Of course, deliberate manipulation of the U.S.
market by a foreign company issuing securities in the United States must be
subject to regulation. But where the impact to U.S. investors is at most
tenuous, general rules forbidding foreign issuers from trading in their own
markets may well be beyond the scope of the SEC's authority.
The growing internationalization of world financial markets also militates
toward flexibility in applying the highly technical trading rules to foreign
companies. When such rules are applied by rote to foreign companies
seeking access to the U.S. market, they seem less like regulation and more
like a protective tariff."5  And that is certainly undesirable-we want
foreign companies to list here. So long as U.S. investors have access to the
information that really matters, they are well-served by the influx of foreign
companies' securities. There is some merit to the admittedly parochial view
of the NYSE's chairperson that it is better for American investors to have
foreign firms list in the United States than in London or Tokyo. The world's
capital markets are becoming increasingly competitive, and some compro-
mise with foreign companies is probably necessary.
The SEC's strategy in all this has been to facilitate the globalization of
markets without compromising the regulation of disclosure. Indeed, in order
for the German companies to exploit the exemption from the trading rules,
the SEC has required them to disclose any trades they make during
distributions.76 Investors are therefore in a position to assess the impact on
the public offering price of such trading. This reliance on disclosure in the
context of the trading rule exemptions represents a return to core principles.
And finally, the grant of relief from the trading rules to German compa-
nies should not be seen as an aberration. A month after the exemption was
granted, an SEC Statement of Policy extended it to "distributions in the
United States of actively traded securities of highly capitalized foreign
7' See supra, text accompanying note 69.
7 The analogy is imperfect, as the trading rules also apply to domestic issuers and
underwriters. However, because financial structures abroad differ fundamentally from the
U.S. model (e.g. interlocks between finance and manufacturing companies in Germany), the
trading rules present more of a barrier to foreign companies than to domestic firms.
76 See supra, text accompanying note 50.
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issuers" generally." And so it appears that the German companies are not
the beneficiaries of special treatment or unwarranted leniency.
IV. CONCLUSION
The SEC's firm stance toward German companies' unprecedented wish to
gain NYSE listing without conforming their financial statements to U.S.
norms represented a principled defense of the values implicit in the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The "what-they-don't-know-won't-
hurt-them" concept of corporate management espoused by German
companies that conceal earnings in hidden reserves cannot be reconciled with
the U.S. federal securities statutes. The SEC's insistence that Daimler
recognize its hidden reserves before listing its shares on NYSE was
appropriate.
At the same time, the SEC knew where to draw the line in its application
of the highly complex trading rules to foreign companies. The exemption
from the rules granted to the German blue chip companies, and soon
extended to highly capitalized foreign companies generally, showed no
disrespect for the values animating the federal securities laws. In addition,
the Commission's flexibility evinced a recognition that the swift movement
toward internationalization of the world capital markets necessitates some
compromise on the application of the trading rules to foreign companies.
Andrew H. Walcoff
Exchange Act Release No. 33,137, 1993 SEC LEXIS 2,999 (Nov. 3, 1993). See Rule
Exceptions Adopted To Ease Rule 144A Offerings to QIBs, 25 Sec. Reg & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
44, at 1524 (Nov. 12, 1993).
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